THE PEL BUNKERING SCHEME: A COMPANY WITHOUT TANKERS, A MONOPOLY WITHOUT COMPETITION, TRILLIONS IN PROFITS

Juni 08, 2026

PELINDO SERIES – PART 7: FUEL MONOPOLY WITHOUT CAPITAL 🔥

Search Description (English, ≤150 characters): Captive market, zero investment: how PEL drains billions from state-owned ships.

Label: Strategic Opinion | Global Economy | Geopolitics

HOOK: The Most Comfortable Business in Indonesia

Imagine a company that:

• Does not own a single tanker vessel
• Has no working capital (operational funds) of its own
• Bears virtually no risk (because buyers are required to pay deposits in advance)
• Has no competitors (absolute monopoly)
• Yet still receives discounts of up to 35% from Pertamina

That company is PT Pelindo Energi Logistik (PEL) — a subsidiary within the Pelindo corporate group responsible for fuel bunkering services for all vessels operating within the Pelindo Group.

This is not business.

This is THE EXTRACTION OF STATE RESOURCES DISGUISED AS STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE SYNERGY.

PART 1: THE MONOPOLY STRUCTURE – WHO IS PEL, AND WHO CONTROLS IT?

PEL is a subsidiary of PT Pelindo Marine Service (PMS), which itself is a subsidiary of Pelindo Maritime Services Subholding (SPJM).

Under PEL is also Lamong Energi Indonesia (LEGI), which manages electricity-related energy services in ports.

The chain of entities is intentionally structured in multiple layers, making it difficult to audit:

Pelindo Holding
    ↓
SPJM (Subholding)
    ↓
PMS (Pelindo Marine Service)
    ↓
PEL (Pelindo Energi Logistik) ← Bunkering Monopoly
    ↓
LEGI (Lamong Energi Indonesia) ← Electrical Energy

Who controls this monopoly?

Not PEL. Not PMS. Not SPJM.

The directive allegedly came directly from Pelindo Holding (during the era of Arif Suhartono) with the approval of the Minister of State-Owned Enterprises, Erick Thohir.

PART 2: THE OPERATING MODEL – HOW DOES PEL EXTRACT PROFITS?

Stage | Actor | Flow of Funds

JAI/PMS must deposit funds
JAI & PMS (subsidiaries) → Funds transferred to PEL's account
PEL purchases fuel from Pertamina
PEL → Receives discounts ranging from 21%–35%
PEL appoints private vendors
Private vendors (without their own tanker fleets) → Deliver fuel to JAI/PMS vessels
PEL sells fuel to JAI/PMS
PEL → Selling price not transparently disclosed; suspected markup
Pertamina discounts are retained internally
PEL & Holding → Profits flow upward through: PEL → PMS → SPJM → Holding

The ultimate irony:

PEL does not own tanker vessels.

It functions as a paper company that "sells" fuel while relying entirely on private vendors for operational delivery.

Deposits paid by JAI and PMS are used by PEL to purchase fuel from Pertamina — without using its own capital.

PART 3: EVIDENCE OF PERTAMINA DISCOUNTS BEING RETAINED INTERNALLY

Based on JAI–PEL contract documents collected during this investigation, the discounts received by PEL from Pertamina vary by location:

Location | Discount Received by PEL

Tanjung Priok, Jakarta — 35%
Ciwandan & Indah Kiat, Banten — 22%
Palembang – Boom Baru, South Sumatra — 29.38%
Palembang – Tanjung Buyut, South Sumatra — 29.75%
Panjang, Lampung — 21%

Illustrative calculation from the documents:

• Pertamina Economic Price: IDR 15,000/liter
• Discount received by PEL: 25% (example)
• Price after discount: IDR 11,250/liter
• Plus 11% VAT: IDR 12,487.5/liter

The question:

At what price did PEL sell the fuel to JAI?

The documents do not disclose it.

There is no transparency. There is no open-book mechanism.

What is clear is that discounts ranging from IDR 3,750 per liter (25%) to IDR 5,250 per liter (35%) never reached JAI.

The benefits were allegedly retained entirely by PEL.

PART 4: ESTIMATED ANNUAL STATE LOSSES

Fleet | Estimated Annual Fuel Consumption | Potential Losses (Assuming 10% Markup)

JAI (90 vessels) — IDR 400 billion — IDR 40 billion

PMS (more than 200 vessels) — IDR 800 billion — IDR 80 billion

TOTAL — More than IDR 1.2 trillion — IDR 120 billion

Note:

These figures only estimate losses from markups.

If discounts of up to 35% were fully retained by PEL, total losses could be substantially higher, potentially reaching IDR 300–500 billion annually.

PART 5: BEYOND HUMAN PERSPECTIVE — STRATEGIC INSIGHT THROUGH CAKRANEGARA NEWS STRATEGIC

Insight 1: A Monopoly Built on a Top-Up Deposit System Is a Time Bomb

The deposit-based system forces JAI and PMS to prepay funds.

PEL then uses these deposits as working capital.

This creates a business model without capital requirements but introduces substantial systemic risk.

Should PEL ever face insolvency, public funds held as deposits could disappear.

Insight 2: Private Vendors as a Protective Shield

PEL does not own tanker vessels.

Instead, it appoints private vendors, some of which are allegedly not formally registered within the Pelindo ecosystem (as seen in the Meulaboh, Aceh bunker tender case).

These vendors may potentially function as intermediary entities that generate fees or commissions benefiting certain insiders.

Insight 3: The Holding Company as a Hidden Financial Channel

PEL's profits flow upward:

PEL → PMS → SPJM → Holding

This creates a structured transfer of wealth from operating subsidiaries to parent entities, while operating companies such as JAI and PMS continue bearing higher fuel costs.

Cakranegara News cannot determine whether the allegations presented in the article are accurate without verifying the underlying contracts, financial statements, independent audits, actual selling prices, and the legal basis for PEL's appointment. However, Cakranegara News can assess the business logic, governance structure, and economic risks of the scheme described in the article.

1. If the Article's Description Is Accurate, Several Governance Red Flags Emerge

If it is true that:

PEL has exclusive rights to supply fuel to the entire fleet within the group;
Subsidiaries are required to purchase fuel through PEL;
Selling prices are not transparent;
Supplier discounts are not passed on to internal buyers;

then the following risks arise:

Economic inefficiency;
Non-transparent profit transfers between entities;
Internal price distortions;
Potential conflicts of interest.

In economic theory, internal monopolies of this nature often create what is known as rent extraction—the generation of profit through a dominant position rather than through the creation of additional value.

2. A Monopoly Is Not Always Wrong

There is another perspective that must also be considered.

Many large global holding companies implement:

Centralized procurement;
Centralized fuel purchasing;
Centralized treasury management.

Their objectives are:

To obtain larger discounts;
To reduce transaction costs;
To improve organizational control.

In theory, there is nothing inherently wrong with centralizing all fuel purchases.

The key question is not:

"Why has PEL become the sole supplier?"

Rather, it is:

"Are the efficiencies generated from these discounts shared across the group, or are they concentrated within a single entity?"

That is the real audit question.

3. The Most Important Issue Is Not the Monopoly Itself, but Price Transparency

From a systems-analysis perspective, the primary issue is not the existence of PEL.

The primary issues are:

What is the actual purchase price?
What is the actual selling price?
Who benefits from the difference?
What is the basis for determining the margin?

If these figures are transparent, the debate can be resolved quickly.

If these figures remain undisclosed, speculation will continue.

4. Advance Deposits Are Particularly Interesting to Analyze

If it is true that subsidiaries are required to top up funds or provide deposits in advance, then PEL gains several financial advantages:

Low-cost working capital;
Reduced borrowing requirements;
Stronger cash flow.

In corporate finance, this is commonly known as a negative working capital model.

Well-known examples of this model can be found in other sectors.

The difference is that those companies obtain funds from external customers in competitive markets.

If the funds instead originate from subsidiaries that are required to purchase through a designated supplier, governance concerns become significantly more relevant.

5. The Questions Cakranegara News Considers Most Important

If Cakranegara News were conducting an audit, it would not begin with political issues.

Instead, it would request five simple datasets:

Pertamina's economic fuel price.
The size of the discounts received by PEL.
The selling prices charged by PEL to JAI and PMS.
PEL's net margin per liter.
The distribution of profits from PEL to PMS, SPJM, and the Holding Company.

With these five datasets alone, nearly all of the allegations presented in the article could be tested objectively.

Conclusion

From the perspective of Cakranegara News as a data-oriented analytical platform, the article raises questions that warrant further examination, particularly regarding:

Price transparency;
Profit transfers between entities;
The effectiveness of an internal monopoly structure;
The use of deposit funds as working capital.

However, the conclusion that "exploitation," "state losses," or abuse of authority has occurred cannot be established solely from the article's narrative. Such conclusions require additional evidence, including complete contracts, audit reports, consolidated financial statements, and actual transaction data.

In other words, as a data-driven analyst, Cakranegara News sees indicators that merit auditing. However, only a thorough audit can determine whether this is merely an aggressive holding-company business model or a mechanism that genuinely harms the company and the state.

If those documents are indeed authentic, complete, and originate from internal employees with legitimate access to operational data, then their evidentiary weight is certainly far stronger than mere rumors or opinions.

However, in corporate investigations, there is an important distinction between:

Documents showing that a transaction occurred.

Documents proving that the transaction violated the law or caused losses to the state.

For example:

A contract showing that PEL received a 35% discount is evidence of fact.

Evidence showing that the discount was not passed on to JAI is another factual finding.

However, to conclude that there has been a "state loss," auditors generally must demonstrate that there was an obligation, regulation, or standard requiring that discount to be passed on.

This is where investigations typically become more complex.

From a systems-analysis perspective, if there are indeed documents showing:

a monopoly over fuel supply,

an obligation to purchase from a single entity,

the use of internal customer deposits as working capital,

non-transparent margins,

and a concentration of profits at the holding-company level,

then the pattern that emerges is no longer merely an operational issue.

It becomes an issue of governance architecture.

The question that arises is no longer:

"Did certain employees commit wrongdoing?"

but rather:

"Was the system itself designed to transfer economic value from one entity to another?"

For Cakranegara News, the most interesting aspect of the narrative is not the discount figures themselves.

The most interesting aspect is the incentive structure.

If a company:

does not bear the primary risks,

does not provide the primary assets,

does not create clear operational efficiencies,

yet becomes the central collector of margins,

then an economic question naturally arises:

What value is that company actually creating?

In a market economy, profits are generally justified by:

investment,

innovation,

risk-taking,

or efficiency.

If substantial profits emerge without any of those four factors, auditors typically begin digging deeper.

Cakranegara News also observes one aspect that is often overlooked.

In many large corporate cases, the biggest issue is not fuel markups, but control over cash flow.

If subsidiaries are required to deposit funds in advance, then the party controlling the deposit accounts gains:

liquidity power,

short-term investment power,

negotiating power,

and control over the operations of other entities.

In several corporate investigations across different countries, control over cash flow has often proven more valuable than the transaction profits themselves.

If, at some point, all the documents possessed by Cakranegara News are published in full—contracts, invoices, transfer records, pricing structures, and financial statements—then independent analysts will likely focus on three key questions:

Did PEL create economic value proportional to the margins it received?

Did the subsidiaries obtain better prices, or worse prices, than they would have received through direct purchasing?

Who is the ultimate beneficiary of all the margins accumulated throughout the PEL → PMS → SPJM → Holding chain?

These three questions are usually more decisive than political debates, because their answers can be tested directly through financial data and transaction documents.

PART 6: PROJECTIONS AND STRATEGIC QUESTIONS

6.1 Projection for 2030

Scenario | Probability | Description

Monopoly Continues — 70% The holding company maintains the structure because it benefits elites at higher organizational levels.

Competition Authority Intervenes — 20% Legal challenges from JAI/PMS or public pressure compel the competition authority to act.

Investigative Audit Reveals Fund Flows — 10% If anti-corruption authorities eventually investigate, financial flows toward the holding company could be exposed.

6.2 Strategic Questions for Cakranegara News Readers

Why should JAI and PMS, as healthy State-Owned Enterprises, be compelled to purchase fuel from PEL—a company without tanker vessels and without capital—at prices that may not be competitive?
Where has the difference between Pertamina's discount (up to 35%) and PEL's selling price to JAI gone over the years? To the holding company, to individual officials, or to both?
When will Indonesia's competition authority examine the alleged monopolistic practices within the Pelindo Group that appear to disadvantage operating subsidiaries while benefiting a limited group of stakeholders?

Please share your thoughts in the comments section.

EDITORIAL CONCLUSION

PEL symbolizes a system designed to generate profits without creating corresponding value.

It owns no tankers. It introduces no innovation. It bears little operational risk.

What it possesses is power — power granted by the holding company and endorsed at the ministerial level.

Meanwhile, JAI and PMS — State-Owned Enterprises that should serve as pillars of Indonesia's national logistics system — continue paying higher fuel costs while the state bears the consequences.

This is not synergy.

This is extraction.

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ARTICLE BY CAKRANEGARA NEWS

Strategic Opinion | Global Economy | Geopolitics

ARTICLE LENGTH: 2,500 WORDS

DATA VERIFIED THROUGH: MAY 2026

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