THE RED SEA'S HIDDEN WAR: While the World Watches Hormuz, Yemen Is Rewriting the Map

 THE RED SEA'S HIDDEN WAR: While the World Watches Hormuz, Yemen Is Rewriting the Map

Core thesis: In 2026, global strategic attention is locked on the Strait of Hormuz—US-Iran conflict, energy transport, diplomatic negotiations. But as the world focuses its gaze there, a quiet strategic redrawing is taking place on Yemen's western coast. In September, the Houthis seized Mocha Port and key islands around Bab el-Mandeb in less than ten days—the most drastic military escalation since the 2022 ceasefire. Saudi Arabia immediately announced it would launch a counteroffensive to retake the waterway, while Turkey and Pakistan began deploying military forces to Saudi Arabia under the newly activated Makkah Defense Pact. Bab el-Mandeb is becoming a "second Hormuz"—not because the two are identical, but because when the world stares at one closed door, another door is changing hands.

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HOOK

10 September 2026. Houthi forces entered Mocha Port. Hours later, their naval forces landed on Perim Island (Mayyun), located in the middle of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, without significant resistance.

On 11 September, the Houthis announced they had seized Yemen's entire western coast, from Mocha south to Lahij Province, just 90 kilometers from Aden. They claimed to have shot down 9 Saudi fighter jets in 32 battles—a figure that cannot be independently verified, but the direction is clear: control of Bab el-Mandeb has changed hands.

In another part of the world, headlines were still about Hormuz. The US-Iran conflict, attacked tankers, nuclear negotiation deadlock. No one noticed that the key to the southern gate of the Red Sea was being taken by a single hand.

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FACT

The Houthi Lightning Offensive

On 3 September 2026, the Houthis launched an offensive with an undisclosed codename. The objective was clear: control Yemen's western coast, and then control Bab el-Mandeb.

10 September: After hours of fighting, the Houthis seized Mocha Port. Government forces retreated toward Dhubab. Mocha is located about 70 kilometers north of the narrowest point of Bab el-Mandeb.

11 September: The Houthis occupied Perim Island (Mayyun), an island located in the middle of the strait, dividing the waterway into two shipping lanes. On the same day, they seized the Hanish Islands and the town of Dhubab.

Houthi spokesman Yahya Sarea announced that the offensive had seized approximately 5,400 square kilometers of territory, and claimed that international maritime traffic was "still safe"—but at the same time insisted that Saudi vessels remain subject to their blockade.

Shipping Data: Down but Not Collapsed

According to IMF PortWatch data, the average number of vessels transiting Bab el-Mandeb per day dropped from 33 to just 4 vessels, a decline of 88 percent. Tanker and chemical vessel traffic fell 91 percent, container ships fell 86 percent.

But TASS calculations based on vessel traffic data show that since July, around 40–45 vessels still transit Bab el-Mandeb daily, down from 50–60 previously, but not completely halted. Lloyd's List Intelligence also showed that in the last week of September, 290 vessels transited Bab el-Mandeb, higher than 264 vessels the previous week.

Data varies, but the trend is clear: traffic is declining, but the waterway has not been closed.

Saudi Reaction: Preparing a Counteroffensive

On 2 October 2026, Reuters reported that Saudi Arabia is planning an offensive against the Houthis, with targets including "coastal advances to protect Red Sea shipping lanes," or "multi-front offensives."

Saudi Arabia is considering two options:

1. Limited coastal operation: Focus on the area around Bab el-Mandeb, retake coastal control

2. Comprehensive multi-front offensive: Including simultaneous attacks in Al-Bayda, Marib, Taiz, and Al-Jawf provinces

According to Reuters, citing six regional and Western officials, potentially mobilizing more than 100,000 Yemeni troops, depending on the scale of the operation.

Saudi-led coalition spokesman Major General Turki al-Maliki announced on 5 October that the coalition had retaken Dhubab, Bab, and Hodeidah north of Bab el-Mandeb, with 100 fighter jets participating in the operation, and claimed to have "secured the right to air defense over Bab el-Mandeb."

But the Houthi counterattack was equally fierce. They advanced toward Yemen's third-largest city, Taiz, claimed control of the important government position of Turbah, and besieged Taiz. According to AFP, fighting in a single day killed more than 70 people. The Houthis also launched ballistic missiles and drones at Riyadh Airport and Aramco refinery facilities.

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DOCUMENT

Document One: Reuters Report on Saudi Plans (2 October 2026)

Reuters cited six sources with knowledge—including Gulf officials, Yemeni officials, and Western diplomats—stating that Saudi Arabia plans to launch an offensive "within weeks," with Yemeni forces leading ground operations and Saudi Arabia providing air strike support. The core objective is to "reverse the Houthis' rapid gains last month, when they advanced along the western coast and seized control of Bab el-Mandeb."

A Western diplomat stated that Riyadh has concluded: "As long as the Houthis control Bab el-Mandeb, it is impossible to negotiate with them for new Yemen peace talks"—because this control gives the Houthis "significant global leverage."

Document Two: Makkah Defense Pact Emergency Meeting Statement (5 October 2026)

Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan held an emergency meeting in Riyadh, announcing "action for the actual implementation of collective defense commitments, deploying military forces and capabilities to Saudi Arabia according to agreed arrangements."

Retired Pakistani Major General Numan Mahmud was appointed as the first Secretary-General of the Makkah Defense Pact for a three-year term.

Pakistan has sent four transport aircraft to Aden, carrying equipment including air defense systems, light artillery, drones, and anti-drone systems. Pakistani military advisers have been working with Yemeni government forces in Saudi Arabia.

Document Three: UN Security Council Emergency Meeting (1 October 2026)

UN Assistant Secretary-General for the Middle East, Europe, the Americas, Asia and the Pacific, Khaled Khiari, condemned Houthi attacks on Saudi civilian and energy infrastructure, and called for "the restoration and respect of navigational rights and freedoms in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb in accordance with international law and Security Council Resolution 2722."

Khiari warned that disruption to this maritime corridor would affect international peace and security, global energy markets, food security, and the economic conditions of the most vulnerable countries.

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TRACE

Trace One: The Actual Scope of Houthi Control

According to Egyptian military and strategic expert Samir Ragheb, the Houthis "have the ability to exercise fire control over Bab el-Mandeb," with their military presence covering "Perim Island, Mocha, Hays, southern Hodeidah, and the eastern coast of Dhamar Province."

Anadolu analysis noted that after the Houthis seized Mocha and nearby islands in September, "their ability to influence maritime traffic in Bab el-Mandeb increased significantly."

Trace Two: Insurance Costs and Route Changes

Ragheb stated that Houthi targeting of civilian and commercial vessels "caused panic, driving insurance prices and costs three times higher, and forcing vessels to reroute through the Cape of Good Hope."

British energy expert Mamdouh Salameh warned that escalation in Bab el-Mandeb occurring simultaneously with disruption in Hormuz "could push Brent crude to above $108, even $110 or $120 per barrel—levels that exceed the global economy's capacity to absorb shocks."

Trace Three: Activation of Regional Military Alliance

The Makkah Defense Pact—signed in August 2026 by Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan—was activated after the Bab el-Mandeb crisis erupted. The three countries held an emergency meeting in Riyadh, deciding to "immediately implement collective defense commitments on the ground."

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Defense Minister Yaşar Güler, and Chief of General Staff Selçuk Bayraktaroğlu attended the meeting.

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NUMBERS

Indicator Data Source

Territory seized by Houthis ~5,400 sq km Houthi claim (not independently verified)

Daily vessels in Bab el-Mandeb (since July) 40–45 TASS

Daily vessels in Bab el-Mandeb (previously) 50–60 TASS

Weekly traffic in late September 290 vessels Lloyd's List

Tanker/chemical decline 91% IMF PortWatch

Potential Yemeni troop mobilization 100,000+ Reuters

Saudi coalition fighter jets 100 Saudi coalition spokesman

Taiz battle deaths (one day) 70+ AFP

Bab el-Mandeb share of global trade 10–12% ABC News

Yemen civil war deaths 150,000+ UN

Displaced by conflict 200,000+ UN

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CONNECTION

Why Bab el-Mandeb Became More Important in the Hormuz Crisis

This is an overlooked chain reaction:

Chain one: Hormuz was blockaded. After the US-Iran war erupted in February 2026, shipping traffic in the Strait of Hormuz was seriously disrupted.

Chain two: Bab el-Mandeb became an alternative route. Saudi Arabia relies on the East-West Pipeline to send oil to Red Sea ports, bypassing Hormuz. But tankers loading from Red Sea ports and sailing south must pass through Bab el-Mandeb.

Chain three: The Houthis exploited this. While global attention was focused on Hormuz, the Houthis launched an offensive in September, seizing the area around Bab el-Mandeb. The Western diplomat cited by Reuters explicitly stated: Bab el-Mandeb "has become more important this year as an alternative route to Hormuz."

Chain four: Leverage effect. Riyadh concluded: as long as the Houthis control Bab el-Mandeb, it is impossible to conduct meaningful peace negotiations—because this control gives the Houthis "significant global leverage" over international shipping.

Chain five: Saudi counteroffensive and alliance activation. Saudi Arabia plans a counteroffensive, while activating the Makkah Defense Pact, drawing Turkey and Pakistan into the Red Sea security architecture.

Key insight: These are not two separate conflicts. These are two battlefields of the same conflict. Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb are not alternatives—they are serial links. When one door is blocked, the strategic value of the other door increases. And when the second door is also threatened, the entire alternative route collapses.

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ANALYSIS

First: Bab el-Mandeb is becoming a "second Hormuz"—but the logic is different.

Hormuz's strategic value lies in the fact that it is the only exit. Bab el-Mandeb's strategic value lies in the fact that it is the必经之路 (necessary passage) on the alternative route. When Hormuz is blockaded, the importance of Bab el-Mandeb increases. But when Bab el-Mandeb is also threatened, the alternative route loses its meaning.

Ragheb's analysis points to a key difference: "This is not a battle between two naval fleets. The Houthis target civilian and commercial vessels, create panic, drive insurance costs three times higher, and force vessels to reroute through the Cape of Good Hope."

Asymmetric warfare, not fleet confrontation. This makes the Bab el-Mandeb threat harder to address—you cannot use a fleet to defend against missiles and drones from a non-state actor.

Second: Saudi Arabia's strategic dilemma is structural.

Saudi Arabia faces a difficult choice: not counterattacking means the Houthis continue to control Bab el-Mandeb and gain global leverage; counterattacking risks being trapped in another Yemen quagmire.

Michael Ratney—former US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia—assessed that the operation "ideally" would be "a fairly limited coastal operation, to retake the coastal area and restore normal maritime traffic."

But the Houthis' counterattack capability cannot be underestimated. They launched missiles and drones at Riyadh Airport and Aramco facilities, killing more than 70 people in Taiz. If the Saudi counteroffensive escalates, Houthi retaliation could target oil infrastructure inside Saudi Arabia—precisely the situation Saudi Arabia feared most after the 2019 Abqaiq attack.

Third: The activation of the Makkah Defense Pact is a structural shift.

The trilateral defense pact between Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan—combining NATO's second-largest military force, the only Muslim country with nuclear weapons, and the Gulf's major power—is moving from paper to the field.

Pakistan has sent transport aircraft carrying air defense systems and drones to Aden, and its military advisers have been working with Yemeni government forces in Saudi Arabia. Turkish drones have been deployed in Yemeni skies.

This means: Red Sea security is shifting from "US-led" to "regional alliance-led." The US provides intelligence support, but explicitly does not directly participate in combat. Turkey provides military support within the framework of the Makkah Defense Pact.

Fourth: Shipping data reveals an overlooked fact—Bab el-Mandeb has not been closed.

Although the Houthis control the surrounding area, although insurance costs have soared, although some vessels are rerouting, Bab el-Mandeb has not been completely closed. TASS data shows 40–45 vessels still transit daily. Lloyd's List data shows 290 vessels transited in the last week of September, higher than 264 vessels the previous week.

The Houthi blockade targets Saudi vessels, not all international shipping. This is different from the 2023–2024 blockade targeting Israel-related vessels. This explains why traffic declined but did not collapse—most vessels are not within the Houthis' targeting scope.

Fifth: The global impact of this conflict is underestimated.

Bab el-Mandeb carries 10–12 percent of global trade. For Asia and Australia, this route is even more critical—oil, medicine, fertilizer, textiles, and machinery are all transported through here.

When Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb are simultaneously threatened, global supply chains face a double bottleneck. Salameh's warning is clear: double disruption could push Brent crude to $120 per barrel, exceeding the global economy's capacity.

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QUESTIONS

Question 1: If Bab el-Mandeb is not completely closed—40–45 vessels still transit daily—then where is the military meaning of "controlling Bab el-Mandeb"? Is the Houthi objective to blockade Saudi shipping, or to build a deterrent capability against international shipping?

Question 2: If the Saudi counteroffensive escalates into a multi-front operation, does the Houthis have the capability to target oil facilities inside Saudi Arabia? Does the precedent of the 2019 Abqaiq attack mean Saudi infrastructure remains vulnerable?

Question 3: Does the activation of the Makkah Defense Pact—drawing Turkey and Pakistan into the Red Sea security architecture—mean a further reduction of the US security role in the Middle East? What does this mean for the regional balance of power?

Question 4: If Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb are threatened simultaneously, is there a viable alternative to the "double bottleneck" of energy markets and global supply chains? Is the cost of rerouting through the Cape of Good Hope sustainable?

Question 5: The UN Security Council has not yet discussed the use of force against the Houthis. In a situation where diplomatic channels are limited, is military means the only option? If not, where is the diplomatic space?

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CONCLUSION

The world is watching Hormuz. This is understandable—US-Iran conflict, energy security, nuclear negotiations, each is at the core of the global agenda.

But beneath the shadow of Hormuz, Yemen is rewriting the map of the Red Sea.

The Houthis seized the area around Bab el-Mandeb in September, gaining leverage over international shipping. Saudi Arabia is preparing a counteroffensive, potentially mobilizing more than 100,000 troops. Turkey and Pakistan are beginning to deploy military forces to Saudi Arabia under the Makkah Defense Pact. The UN warns that disruption to this corridor will affect global peace, energy markets, and food security.

Bab el-Mandeb is not a "second Hormuz." It is an extension of the Hormuz crisis—a process in which, while the world stares at the first door, the second door is being re-locked.

And when both doors are threatened simultaneously, the "alternative route" of global trade becomes an illusion. Rerouting through the Cape of Good Hope takes three times longer. Insurance costs have already tripled. Brent crude could be pushed to $120.

This is not a war about Yemen. This is a war about the gates of world trade. And the world has not noticed.

Search Description (150 words):

While the world watches Hormuz, Yemen is rewriting the map. This CakraNegara News deep analysis reveals how Houthi forces seized the Bab el-Mandeb Strait in September 2026—capturing Mocha and Perim Island in a rapid advance that shifted control of the Red Sea's southern gate. Saudi Arabia is now planning a counteroffensive that could mobilize over 100,000 troops, while Turkey and Pakistan deploy forces under the newly activated Makkah Defense Pact. Drawing on Reuters, UN Security Council statements, IMF PortWatch data, and Lloyd's List Intelligence, the article traces how Hormuz's closure elevated Bab el-Mandeb's strategic value—and how simultaneous threats to both chokepoints could push Brent crude above $120 per barrel. This is not a war about Yemen. It is a war about the gates of world trade.

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