THE UNDERSEA CABLE WAR: Who Controls the Internet's Physical Infrastructure?

 THE UNDERSEA CABLE WAR: Who Controls the Internet's Physical Infrastructure?

Core thesis: The physical infrastructure of the internet is not controlled by governments. It is controlled by four American tech giants. Google, Meta, Microsoft, and Amazon own or lease roughly 70 to 75 percent of the world's submarine cable bandwidth. Meanwhile, the cables that carry 99 percent of intercontinental data are becoming a new front in US-China geopolitical competition. This "cable war" is not about who lays the cables—it is about who decides where they go, where they land, and who is allowed to build them.

---

HOOK

99 percent.

That is the proportion of global intercontinental data traffic that passes through submarine cables. Emails, video calls, financial transactions, AI training data—all of it travels through fiber optic cables lying on the ocean floor.

There are more than 600 active and planned submarine cables in the world, with a total length exceeding 1.5 million kilometers. They form the physical backbone of the global internet.

But who owns these cables?

The answer is not governments. The answer is four companies: Google, Meta, Microsoft, and Amazon.

According to data from the European Union Blue Economy Observatory, tech companies currently control approximately 71 percent of the used international capacity in submarine cables. On the North Atlantic route, that proportion rises to around 90 percent.

The physical arteries of the internet are in the hands of four companies.

---

FACT

The Shift in Ownership from Telecom Operators to Tech Giants

Until a few years ago, submarine cables were built and owned by consortiums of traditional telecom operators. Each consortium member received a certain share of bandwidth, and the remaining capacity was wholesaled to other operators.

That model has collapsed. Tech giants are no longer merely cable renters—they have become primary builders and owners.

· Google has been involved in more than 30 cable projects, with 18 of them entirely owned exclusively by Google.

· Meta is involved in the 2Africa project, the longest submarine cable in the world today.

· Microsoft is involved in the Marea project.

· Amazon is expanding investment to support its global AWS data centers.

Why do tech giants own cables?

Not out of philanthropy. Because AI, cloud computing, and streaming require dedicated bandwidth with low latency and high reliability. Owning cables instead of renting them means tech giants can ensure their platforms run with the lowest latency, eliminating dependence on third parties.

Cable Manufacturing: An Oligopoly Market

Cable ownership and cable manufacturing are two different things. The manufacturing market is highly concentrated:

Manufacturer Country

SubCom United States

Alcatel Submarine Networks France

NEC Japan

HMN Tech China

These four companies produce approximately 98 percent of global submarine cables. They not only manufacture, but also design networks, lay cables, maintain them, and repair faults. This makes them structural nodes for the future of the global digital economy.

---

DOCUMENT

Document 1: TeleGeography Data

TeleGeography data shows that hyperscale tech companies (hyperscalers) are involved in more than two-thirds of all planned submarine cable deployments. Google alone has anchored eight new systems in the Asia-Pacific region.

Document 2: European Union Blue Economy Observatory Data

Tech companies control approximately 71 percent of the used international capacity in submarine cables, and around 90 percent on the North Atlantic route.

Document 3: Global Voices Advox Report (October 2026)

"Google, Amazon, Meta, and Microsoft currently own more than around 75 percent of the world's submarine cables. These companies control the paths of physical information flows, and the platforms that circulate through those paths."

Document 4: New FCC Regulations (June 2026)

The US Federal Communications Commission unanimously passed new rules that, for the first time, require operators of submarine line terminal equipment to apply for licenses. Operators that do not use "foreign equipment that may pose a security risk" can obtain expedited approval—effectively excluding Chinese suppliers from US landing points, while benefiting companies like Meta and Alphabet.

Document 5: The SeaMeWe-6 Case

The cable, approximately 21,700 kilometers long, connects Singapore and France. Initially, China's HMN Tech was expected to build it. But after US lobbying, the contract was awarded to US-based SubCom. Analysts noted that this shows submarine cable projects are increasingly influenced by geopolitical factors, rather than solely cost or technology.

---

TRACE

Trace 1: How US-China Competition Is Reshaping Cable Routes

The US-China competition in submarine cables has evolved from "who builds" to "who is allowed to build" and "where it lands."

· United States: Through FCC regulation, the Clean Cable initiative, and diplomatic pressure, the US restricts Chinese company involvement in sensitive cable projects. In July 2026, the US State Department planned to add nearly $500 million** for projects to "counter China's influence," including **$175.8 million to replace old cables in the Caribbean and Central America, pushing relevant countries to adopt alternative solutions from the US and its "trusted partners."

· China: Expanding its presence through HMN Tech and the "Digital Silk Road." But HMN Tech is gradually being squeezed out of major contracts.

Trace 2: The Physical Vulnerability of Cables

According to data from the International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC), 150 to 200 cable faults are recorded globally each year, most caused by ship anchors or fishing nets, and a small portion by earthquakes and landslides.

But geopolitical tensions have heightened concerns about deliberate interference. Maritime chokepoints such as the Red Sea, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Strait of Malacca are also cable routes. Any long-term disruption in these areas—whether military operations, naval deployments, or maritime access restrictions—could force internet traffic to reroute through longer paths, affecting digital services, financial transactions, and cloud connectivity.

Trace 3: How AI Is Accelerating Cable Demand

AI, cloud computing, and streaming are driving bandwidth demand to grow at an unprecedented rate. International bandwidth has more than doubled since 2021. New systems now include up to 48 pairs of optical fibers.

Meta's Project Waterworth—a cable spanning more than 50,000 kilometers across the Pacific, Atlantic, and Indian Oceans—represents this shift in investment scale. From 2025 to 2027, investment in new cable projects will exceed $13 billion.

---

NUMBERS

Indicator Data Source

Intercontinental data via submarine cables 99% CNA

International capacity controlled by tech companies ~71% EU Blue Economy Observatory

Tech company share on North Atlantic route ~90% EU Blue Economy Observatory

Active and planned cables globally 600 Global Voices

Total cable length 1.5 million km Global Voices

Global share of four cable manufacturers ~98% Guancha

Annual cable faults 150-200 ICPC

New project investment 2025-2027 $13 billion Al Majalla

International bandwidth growth since 2021 2x Al Majalla

---

CONNECTION

Why Cable Ownership Matters More Than Cable Laying

First, cables determine the direction of data flows.

When Google decides a cable connects the US to Europe rather than Africa, it is not just choosing a route—it is determining which regions get low-latency connectivity, and which are excluded. Private investment tends to concentrate in areas with high traffic and predictable commercial returns. Remote island nations and many developing economies remain dependent on limited connectivity, because building cables for small markets is financially unattractive.

Second, landing points determine legal jurisdiction.

The cable itself lies beneath the high seas, but the landing point is in sovereign territory. Whoever controls the landing point controls the legal status of the cable. The new FCC regulations in the US target precisely this: by controlling landing equipment in US territory, the US can determine which cables are allowed to connect to the US network.

Third, manufacturers determine supply chain security.

Cable manufacturing is highly oligopolistic. If one manufacturer is excluded from a market, alternatives are limited. The US is pushing to exclude China's HMN Tech from major contracts, but this means choices for other buyers—including developing countries—are reduced, and costs may rise.

Fourth, cables are the physical prerequisite of the AI economy.

AI requires massive amounts of data to flow between data centers. Without high-capacity, low-latency cables, AI training and inference cannot scale geographically. Tech giants own the cables, which means they own the physical pathways of the AI economy.

---

ANALYSIS

First: The cable war is not "state vs state," but "state vs company."

Discussions about submarine cables often focus on US-China competition. But the data reveals a more complex reality: cable networks are overwhelmingly owned and operated by private companies. States (the US and China) try to influence cable routes and suppliers through regulation and diplomacy, but they cannot simply "command" these networks, because non-state actors—tech giants—act according to different logics.

Second: US advantage is not built through law, but through market power.

The US does not need comprehensive legislation to gain control over cables. The capital power of Google, Meta, Microsoft, and Amazon has already achieved this. FCC regulation merely complements this market power when cables land in US territory. Where cables do not land in the US, US law cannot reach, but the commercial decisions of tech giants still shape the network.

Third: Developing countries are the biggest losers in this war.

When tech giants decide cable routes, they prioritize markets with high traffic and high returns. Remote islands, parts of Africa, inland South Asia—these regions are on the periphery of the cable map, because private investment cannot profit from them. They are not only excluded from cable construction decisions, but may also face higher costs and fewer choices due to US-China competition.

Fourth: The physical vulnerability of cables is a geopolitical risk.

The Red Sea, Hormuz, Malacca—these maritime chokepoints are not only corridors for oil and containers, but also for cables. Any long-term disruption in these areas can affect global digital connectivity. But cable protection mechanisms—international maritime law, naval patrols, repair fleets—lag far behind the pace of evolving threats.

Fifth: Cable competition in the AI era will only intensify.

AI's demand for bandwidth is exponential. Tech giants are investing in new cables at a rate of hundreds of billions of dollars. This means in the coming years, cable ownership concentration may increase further, not decrease. For countries not on the "Big Four" list—including traditional European telecom operators—they are becoming capacity customers of infrastructure owned by their largest traffic competitors.

---

QUESTIONS

Question 1: If four US companies own around 75% of global submarine cable bandwidth, what does "internet openness" mean at the physical level?

Question 2: If cable routes are determined by private capital, rather than international institutions or state governments, how are the connectivity needs of remote and developing regions met?

Question 3: If the US excludes Chinese manufacturers from the cable supply chain through FCC regulation and diplomatic pressure, will this raise global cable costs and limit developing countries' choices?

Question 4: If cables in the Red Sea or Strait of Malacca are disrupted by conflict, does the global digital economy have sufficient redundancy to absorb the shock?

Question 5: If AI-driven bandwidth demand continues to grow exponentially, will cable ownership concentration worsen further, rather than ease?

---

CONCLUSION

The physical infrastructure of the internet is not neutral. It is built by capital, owned by companies, and shaped by geopolitics.

Google, Meta, Microsoft, and Amazon own around 75% of global submarine cable bandwidth. Four manufacturers produce around 98% of global cables. The US and China compete for cable routes and suppliers. And developing countries—whose data needs are growing, but who lack capital, lack manufacturing capacity, lack geopolitical leverage—are excluded from decisions that determine their connectivity futures.

The cable war is not about who lays the cables. It is about who decides where cables go, where they land, and who is allowed to build them.

And in the AI era, the answers to these questions will determine who owns the physical pathways of the digital economy.

Search Description (150 words):

The physical infrastructure of the internet is not controlled by governments. It is controlled by four American tech giants. Google, Meta, Microsoft, and Amazon own or lease roughly 70-75% of the world's submarine cable bandwidth. Meanwhile, the cables that carry 99% of intercontinental data are becoming a new front in US-China geopolitical competition. This CakraNegara News deep analysis examines the "cable war"—not about who lays the cables, but about who decides where they go, where they land, and who is allowed to build them. Drawing on TeleGeography, EU Blue Economy Observatory, FCC filings, and industry data, the article traces how ownership shifted from telecom consortiums to hyperscalers, how manufacturing remains an oligopoly of four companies, and how developing countries are being left out of decisions that shape their digital futures.

🦅 Cakranegara News com